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A philosophical reception of Homer: Homeric courage in Aristotle’s discussion of 
ἀνδρεία. 
 
Homer’s representation of the heroic warriors of the Iliad bequeathed to the Greeks 
paradigmatic examples of martial valour as models for emulation and comparison: heroic 
figures such as Achilles, Hector, and Diomedes became a benchmark for subsequent 
discussions of courage and military prowess by poets, prose authors, and even philosophers. 
This paper explores how Homeric courage forms part of τὰ ἔνδοξα, that is, the reputable 
views that inform Aristotle’s discussion of ἀνδρεία in the Nicomachean Ethics. I aim to show 
how Aristotle responds to the Homeric idea of courage and how he appropriates Homer to 
elucidate his own conception of genuine ἀνδρεία. I shall start by briefly summarizing 
Aristotle’s position.  
Aristotle’s discussion of ἀνδρεία as a particular virtue of character (EN III.6-9) can be 
divided into two parts. In the main body of his exposition (EN 1115a6-1116a15, 1117a29-
1117b22), Aristotle discusses what we may describe as ἀνδρεία proper or genuine ἀνδρεία, 
which he defines as a mean state with regard to fear and confidence (EN 1115a6-7). Aristotle 
places ἀνδρεία exclusively in the field of battle and thus narrows its scope in comparison to 
Plato.1 For Aristotle, to display ἀνδρεία is to show the appropriate amount of fear and 
confidence and act accordingly when faced with the dangers and the fear-inspiring 
circumstances of the battlefield (EN 1115a28-35). The performance of one or more 
courageous actions, however, does not necessarily make one courageous. According to 
Aristotle, an action qualifies as a genuine manifestation of the relevant virtue only if the agent 
acts with the proper motivation. Courage, therefore, like other virtues of character, should be 
displayed ‘for the sake of the noble’, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα (EN 1115b11-13, 23-24; 1122b7).  
In the remaining of his discussion (EN 1116a15-1117a28), Aristotle describes and 
examines certain states, which are commonly thought to conduce to courageous behaviour. 
The discussion of these states aims to show how ordinary conceptions of courage fail to 
qualify as proper ἀνδρεία in the Aristotelian sense. At the same time, by contrasting his own 
understanding of courage with popular views about it, Aristotle elucidates the true nature and 
                                                 
1 By narrowing ἀνδρεία to its most paradigmatic manifestation, namely courage displayed in the battlefield, 
Aristotle responds to Plato’s Socrates, who in the Laches (191d-e) extends the field of ἀνδρεία to include one’s 
courageous stance in the face of various adversities, such as poverty, disease, or sea-danger. For Aristotle, the 
application of ἀνδρεῖος in such cases is a metaphorical use of the word (καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, EN 1115a19) which 
extends ἀνδρεία beyond its proper field, cf. Stewart 1892, I, 283-4. On the different methodology that Plato and 
Aristotle employ in their treatment of the particular virtues, see Joachim 1951, 113-4. 
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scope of this virtue. It is this part of Aristotle’s exposition that is most relevant for the 
examination of his reception and use of Homer.    
Aristotle discusses five defective forms of courage. First, πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία, ‘citizen 
courage’, is the kind of courage displayed by citizen soldiers, who are motivated by a desire 
to win honour and avoid disgrace and the penalties imposed by the laws (EN 1116a17-
1116b3). The second form is the kind of courage resulting from experience in certain 
conditions (ἐμπειρία), such as the courage displayed by mercenary soldiers (EN 1116b3-23). 
Third comes the courage that results from spirit or passion, θυμός, which resembles the 
ferocity of wild beasts (EN 1116b23-1117a9). Courage can also be displayed, fourth, by 
hopeful people (εὐέλπιδες), who feel confident because of past successes (EN 1117a9-22). 
Finally, one can display courage as a result of ignorance of the impending danger (EN 
1117a22-28).  
It has long been observed by Aristotle scholars that the classification of the defective 
forms of courage has its roots in Plato.2 The role of technical expertise or skill (τέχνη) in the 
display of courage and the connection between courage and the spirited part of the human 
soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) are recurrent ideas in the discussions of ἀνδρεία in the Platonic 
dialogues.3 Even the term πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία that Aristotle uses (EN 1116a17) seems to have 
been borrowed from Plato.4  
These Platonic resonances, however, are only part of the picture of Aristotle’s sources. 
In his discussion of the defective forms of courage, Aristotle explicitly establishes Homer as 
a source for two of these forms, namely πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία and the ἀνδρεία of θυμός. In 
each case, Aristotle develops his argument in two steps. He first describes the nature of the 
defective form of courage in question, and then furnishes his discussion with citations of, 
and/or allusions to, Homer. Aristotle’s use of Homer in this part of the discussion is a 
purposeful act of reception with a twofold aim: first, to illustrate by means of concrete 
examples the form of courage described; second, to reinforce his argument, by adducing the 
                                                 
2 Grant 1885, II, 37. 
3 Experience in a certain skill and courage: La. 192d-193e, Prt. 349e-351b; θυμός and courage: R. 410d-412a.  
4 Grant 1885, II, 37; Joachim 1951, 120. At R. 430b-c, πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is defined as the ‘power to preserve 
through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t’ (transl. 
Grube, rev. by Reeve). Plato uses the term πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία to distinguish the courage of the civilized man 
from the impetus of animals or slaves, who may appear to act courageously when driven by their natural 
instincts but in truth they are not, since their actions are not the result of education inculcated by law. The idea 
that true courage should be cultural, not natural, and a result of rational choice is formulated already in fifth 
century political discourse. Athenian democratic ideology, in its attempt for self-definition, presented Athenian 
courage as a result of free choice and rational thought in contrast to Spartan courage which was a result of 
constant hardship, enforced discipline, and external pressure, see Bassi 2003, 47-8; Balot 2004.    
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authority of the poet.5 This use of Homer to elucidate and strengthen a philosophical 
argument reveals something about the context of reception and Aristotle’s attitude towards 
the source text itself. On the one hand, for an example to achieve its purpose it must be 
immediately recognizable by those to whom it is addressed. The use of Homeric examples, 
therefore, suggests that Aristotle’s audience was (or should be) able to identify these 
examples and understand how they can help illustrate the point just made. On the other hand, 
the very fact that Aristotle adduces Homer to reinforce his argument suggests that in his view 
the two defective forms of courage in question are evidenced already in the epics. In other 
words, in Aristotle’s mind Homer has already grasped an essential truth about the nature of 
courage.  
Let us then describe the two defective forms of courage as ‘Homeric’ and assess their 
status vis-à-vis Aristotle’s genuine ἀνδρεία. This discussion will show how Aristotle 
responds to the Homeric conception of courage and how he reworks the Homeric material in 
accordance with his philosophical outlook. 
 
The courage of θυμός 
In the epics θυμός is the seat of the affective life, it is therefore the physical basis that 
produces, among other things, the passion that prompts one to act courageously.6 Aristotle 
endorses this prevalent conception of θυμός and argues that θυμός is ‘most eager’ 
(ἰτητικώτατον) to rush on dangers (EN 1116b26-27).7 To elucidate this form of courage 
Aristotle uses two sets of Homeric examples. One set comprises quotations of Homeric 
formulaic phrases which describe the rousing of a hero’s spirit, usually as a result of the 
intervention of some god:   
ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος (a) “σθένος 
ἔμβαλε θυμῷ” καὶ (b) “μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε” καὶ (c) “δριμὺ δ’ ἀνὰ ῥῖνας 
                                                 
5 For the Greek practice of citing poetry in general and Homer in particular to illustrate or reinforce a point of 
view, see Halliwell 2000, 95-99. 
6 Il. 3.8-9, 5.792, 15.561-4, 19.164-6; Od.1.320-2. On Homeric θυμός, see Redfield 1994, 173-4; Hobbs 2000, 
8. 
7 Stewart (1892, I, 296) points to Prt. 349e, where Protagoras says of courageous men that they are confident 
and ready for action (ἴτας) in circumstances in which most men would be fearful. As has already been stressed, 
the Homeric idea that θυμός contributes to courage is discussed and elaborated in Plato’s Republic. Although 
Plato’s conception of θυμός is not identical to the Homeric one, Plato endorses the Homeric insight about the 
connection between θυμός and martial valour and links closely the spirited part of human soul (τὸ θυμοειδές) 
to the virtue of courage. For an extensive discussion of the Platonic conception of ἀνδρεία and its relation to 
θυμός or τὸ θυμοειδές, see Hobbs 2000. For a discussion of ἠνορέη (‘manliness’), the Homeric precursor of 
ἀνδρεία, see Graziosi & Haubold 2003.   
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μένος” καὶ (d) “ἔζεσεν αἷμα·” πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ 
θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν.8 
      (EN 1116b26-30) 
 
For spirit is something which especially spurs people on to face dangers; hence we have 
in Homer ‘he cast strength into his spirit’ and ‘he stirred up rage and spirit’ and ‘fierce 
rage breathed through his nostrils’ and ‘his blood boiled’. All such expressions seem to 
stand for impetus and the rousing of spirit.
9
 
       
The second set of examples builds on the familiar comparison of courageous men with wild 
beasts.10 Here Aristotle does not cite but rather alludes to Homeric lines, and in particular to 
Homeric similes, where a warrior’s courageous behaviour is compared to the sturdy boldness 
of some animal in a situation of danger. Aristotle comments on the bold behaviour of 
animals: 
οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ’ ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν 
κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι 
ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· 
(EN 1116b33-1117a1) 
 
Now rushing into danger because one is driven on by pain and spirit without any sense in 
advance of the frightening things one has to face is not courage, because on that score 
even donkeys would be courageous when hungry, since they don’t stop grazing even 
when they are beaten. 
    
Aristotle’s image is an allusion to the famous Homeric simile where Telamonian Ajax, in his 
slow and unwilling retreat in the face of a Trojan assault, is compared to an ass who does not 
stop feeding itself, although it is being incessantly beaten by children (Il. 11.558-65).11 From 
the very beginning of the discussion of ἀνδρεία of θυμός Aristotle compares this form of 
courage to the fury and ferocious spirit of animals: 
καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ 




People also bring spirit under the heading of courage. Those who from spirit rush like 
wild beasts against those who have injured them also seem courageous, since for their 
part courageous people are spirited. 
       
The image of wounded beasts attacking their pursuers, to which Aristotle compares those 
driven by their spirit into acting courageously, is less specific than the aforementioned 
                                                 
8 Aristotle quotes from memory, and as a result inaccurately, from (a) Il. 11.11-12 (μέγα σθένος ἔμβαλ’ 
ἑκάστῳ καρδίῃ) and 16.528-9 (μένος δέ οἱ ἔμβαλε θυμῷ), (b) Il. 15.594-5 (ἔγειρε μένος μέγα, θέλγε δὲ 
θυμὸν), (c) Od. 24.318-9 (τοῦ δ’ ὠρίνετο θυμός, ἀνὰ ῥῖνας δέ οἱ ἤδη / δριμὺ μένος...), (d) the expression 
ἔζεσεν αἷμα does not occur in Homer; cf. Stewart 1892, I, 297; Burnet 1900, 148, 150; Irwin 1999, 213. 
9 All the translations of the EN are taken from Taylor 2006 with minor alterations. 
10 Cf. Pl. La. 196e; R. 430b8. 
11 Cf. Stewart 1892, I, 297; Burnet 1900, 150; Irwin 1999, 213. 
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example of the ass. Nonetheless, given the recurrence of the references to Homer in this part 
of the EN, I argue that we can read this image as another allusion to a Homeric simile. When 
the Trojan Agenor decides to hold his ground and face the raging Achilles, his bold 
determination is compared to that of a leopard, which though wounded does not give up its 
fight against those who attack it:  
ἠΰτε πάρδαλις εἶσι βαθείης ἐκ ξυλόχοιο  
ἀνδρὸς θηρητῆρος ἐναντίον, οὐδέ τι θυμῷ 
ταρβεῖ οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, ἐπεί κεν ὑλαγμὸν ἀκούσῃ·   
εἴ περ γὰρ φθάμενός μιν ἢ οὐτάσῃ ἠὲ βάλῃσιν, 
ἀλλά τε καὶ περὶ δουρὶ πεπαρμένη οὐκ ἀπολήγει 
ἀλκῆς, πρίν γ’ ἠὲ ξυμβλήμεναι ἠὲ δαμῆναι· 
ὣς Ἀντήνορος υἱὸς ἀγαυοῦ δῖος Ἀγήνωρ  
οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν, πρὶν πειρήσαιτ’ Ἀχιλῆος. 
    (Il. 21.573-80) 
 
But as a leopard emerges out of her timbered cover 
to face the man who is hunting her and takes no terror 
in her heart nor thought of flight when she hears them baying against her; 
and even though one be too quick for her with spear thrust or spear thrown  
stuck with the shaft though she be she will not give up her fighting  
fury, till she has closed with one of them or is overthrown; 
so the son of proud Antenor, brilliant Agenor, 
was unwilling to run away until he had tested Achilleus (transl. Lattimore).12  
 
This form of courage can be understood as a sudden emotional impulse that emerges as 
a reaction to a certain stimulus and urges one onto unreflective engagement with some 
danger. According to Aristotle, it is the most natural type of ἀνδρεία (φυσικωτάτη, EN 
1117a4): it is an irrational, purely physical type of courage, which owes more to natural 
instincts than to cultural norms or experience. People who display this type of courage, like 
wild beasts, act because of pain (διὰ λύπην, EN 1116b32) and from their passion (διὰ 
πάθος, EN 1117a8-9), without any appreciation of the danger they face. By contrasting the 
Homeric ἀνδρεία of θυμός to genuine ἀνδρεία, Aristotle does not aim to question the role of 
θυμός in courage altogether. In Aristotle’s view, the spirited element of human nature does 
contribute to the display of courage (συνεργεῖ, EN 1116b31), but its role in promoting 
courageous behaviour must be subsidiary, not primary. This is precisely why wild beasts and 
                                                 
12 Note the reference to the θυμός of the leopard (574) as well as to its ἀλκή (578), which does not cease 
although the animal is hurt: at EN 1115b4-5, Aristotle concludes his response to the Socratic widening of 
ἀνδρεία by arguing that people show courage (ἀνδρίζονται) in circumstances which admit of ἀλκή or in which 
it is καλόν to die. In the EE discussion of courage, Aristotle compares the courage of θυμός to the fury of wild 
boars (ἄγριοι σύες), which display such behaviour when they are beside themselves (EE 1229a25-27). Again, 
the image of the distraught wild boar seems to be an allusion to a Homeric simile: at Il. 13.471-4, Idomeneus is 
compared to a wild boar (σῦς), whose back bristles and whose eyes are ‘shining with fire’ as it stands up to a 
group of men attacking it.  
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θυμός-driven humans fail to qualify as properly courageous: their spirit is the primary 
motivational force that incites their courageous behaviour. For Aristotle, θυμός provides only 
the natural basis required for courageous action and is inadequate by itself to produce genuine 
ἀνδρεία: 
φυσικωτάτη δ’ ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ 
τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, 
τιμωρούμενοι δ’ ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι 
δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος· 
      (EN 1117a4-9)  
 
Now courage prompted by spirit seems to be something purely natural, but it is when in 
addition it includes choice and the goal that it is courage. And people feel distress when 
they are roused to anger, and pleasure when they retaliate; people who fight for these 
reasons are combative, but not courageous; for they do not do it for the sake of the noble 
or as reason prescribes, but from feeling.  
  
The courage of spirit requires two additional elements to become genuine ἀνδρεία: 
deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) and proper motivation or direction towards the proper goal 
(τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα). Courageous actions do not consist in rushing foolhardily into every danger. 
They must be rationally chosen and dictated by reason (λόγος), after calculating the nature of 
the impending danger, the alternative courses of action open to one, and what one puts at 
stake by risking one’s life in battle. Furthermore, genuine ἀνδρεία requires proper motivation 
on the part of the agent. In Aristotle’s theory of virtue, performing virtuous actions is not 
enough for making one truly virtuous; one must also act for a certain reason. Courageous 
behaviour motivated by pain or passion does not count as genuine ἀνδρεία. The truly 
courageous man is expected to act ‘for the sake of the noble’ (διὰ τὸ καλόν or τοῦ καλοῦ 
ἕνεκα).13 
 
πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία, ‘citizen courage’ 
Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία, one of which ranks 
higher than the other. The lower form of πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is a result of compulsion and fear. 
It is displayed by soldiers who maintain their posts and fight because their commanders use 
coercive means, such as punishments and beatings, to enforce their obedience. Again, 
Aristotle chooses a Homeric example to elucidate this form of courage: he cites 
Agamemnon’s words to his troops, by means of which Agamemnon threatens with death 
                                                 
13 On the two requirements, see Joachim 1951, 121; Deslauriers 2003, 189-90. 
7 
 
anyone who stays by the ships and avoids fighting (EN 1116a29-35).14 In its higher form, 
πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is motivated by a sense of shame towards the opinion of others (δι’ αἰδῶ, 
ΕΝ 1116a28). This latter form of πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία ranks higher than the former, for in 
Aristotle’s view shame is superior to fear as an incentive to action. Fear is what the many (οἱ 
πολλοί) respond to: such people do the right thing only to avoid the pain of punishment. On 
the other hand, responsiveness to shame is a mark of better upbringing and of having already 
acquired a sense of what is noble and truly pleasant (EN 1179b10-16). Acting out of shame 
and the desire to avoid doing what is considered disgraceful suggests that one pays due 
respect to the opinion of others and has been properly habituated in acting in accordance with 
the values of the community. In other words, whereas fear implies blind conformity to the 
precepts of others with a view to avoiding external sanctions, shame requires the 
internalization by the agent of the values of the community: one who acts out of shame has 
made the values of the community one’s own.15 
This higher form of ‘citizen courage’, Aristotle says, is mostly displayed in societies 
where the complementary concepts of honour and shame weigh heavily and are regarded as 
major motivational factors. Aristotle finds that the society which best fits this description is 
the society depicted in the epics, so he adduces Homer once again to reinforce his argument 
and elucidate it by means of two concrete examples:  
δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων 
ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν 
εἶναι παρ’ οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ 
Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα·  
        Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει· 
καὶ [Διομήδης]  
        Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ’ ἀγορεύων   
        “Τυδείδης ὑπ’ ἐμεῖο.” 
      (EN 1116a18-26) 
 
Citizens seem to face dangers because of the penalties of the law and public disgrace and 
honour, and therefore the most courageous seem to be those among whom the cowardly 
are disgraced and the courageous honoured. Homer depicts people of that kind, such as 
Diomede and Hector, who say 
Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach on me 
and  
Hector will say when he speaks to the Trojans 
‘The son of Tydeus has fled from me.’ 
 
                                                 
14 The reference is to Il. 2.391-3, but Aristotle wrongly attributes these words to Hector instead of Agamemnon, 
cf. Stewart 1892, I, 293.  
15 Cf. Williams 1993, 78-85 and Cairns 1993, 16-17, 43-44, 80-81, who respond to Dodds’ (1951, 17-8) famous 
description of Homeric society as a ‘shame-culture’. 
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Aristotle’s knowledge of Homer becomes evident in this context, since the examples he 
chooses to use from the Iliad are particularly successful in showing how one’s sense of 
shame can generate courageous behaviour. The first is derived from Hector’s famous 
monologue before his final battle with Achilles. Hector anticipates the heavy criticism he will 
incur from Polydamas for not heeding his prudent advice and decides to remain outside the 
walls of Troy and confront the raging Achilles (Il. 22.99-110). In the second example, 
Diomedes, forced by Zeus’ thunderbolt to abandon his advance, complains that should he 
hearken to Nestor’s advice and retreat before Hector, Hector’s boast would make him suffer 
an insufferable loss of face (Il. 8.146-50).  
Having clearly illustrated the nature of πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία, Aristotle then goes on to 
describe its workings and explain how it relates to genuine ἀνδρεία: 
ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ,16 ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' 
αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ 
ὄντος.  
 
This sort most closely resembles the one previously discussed [i.e. genuine courage], 
because it comes about from virtue, i.e. from shame and the desire for a noble thing 
(namely honour) and the avoidance of disgrace, as something shameful. 
 
Aristotle’s construal of πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία fits perfectly in the Homeric framework and 
captures the epic representation of military prowess, its motivation, and its scope. The martial 
valour of a Homeric hero is the most evident manifestation of his ἀρετή,17 which is motivated 
by his sense of αἰδώς towards his milieu: in battle circumstances, the single cry for αἰδώς is 
the most common way to prompt slacking or discouraged men back into action.18 By 
displaying his prowess in battle, the Homeric hero seeks to secure for himself τιμή, which 
entails both respect and a good name among his peers and the more concrete material 
possessions and privileges that accompany his superior status and social position.19 Failure or 
unwillingness to display courage besmirches one’s τιμή and results in the disgraceful 
condition of being open to the reproach of others.20 Thus, the higher form of Aristotle’s 
‘citizen courage’ corresponds to the most typical form of Homeric courage, namely courage 
motivated by a sense of shame in the face of public criticism. 
This form of courage, Aristotle says, is most akin, but not tantamount, to genuine 
ἀνδρεία. This is due to the status of honour (τιμή), the complementary concept of shame, as 
                                                 
16 Cf. ΕΝ 1116a17: μάλιστα ἔοικεν. 
17 Il. 8.535-6, 11.90-1, 11.407-10, 11.762-4, 13.276-86, 22.268-9. 
18 Il. 5.529-32, 5.787, 8.228.  
19 Il. 12.310-21, 8.161-6, 9.601-5. 
20 Il. 2.119-22, 2.295-8, 4.242-6, 11.313-5.  
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a motive for action. Aristotle classifies honour as ‘the greatest of the external goods’ (EN 
1123b20-21) but rejects the view of those who consider it the supreme good of human life 
(EN 1095b22-26). Honour is indeed a noble motive, since it is not distributed haphazardly but 
is bestowed only upon those who promote, or are in a position to promote, the community’s 
well-being (Rh. 1361a28-30). In this light, displaying courage with a view to honour is finer 
than being courageous for the sake of acquiring less admirable goods, such as power or 
wealth. In Aristotle’s theory of virtue, however, honour does not constitute the proper 
motivation for a truly virtuous action. If one fights bravely being primarily motivated by the 
honour that customarily ensues from such actions, then one is motivated by external rewards 
rather than by the nature of the action itself. In Aristotelian terms, this amounts to performing 
an action for an external end, which violates one of the requirements of virtuous actions, 
namely that the action must be chosen for its own sake (προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά, EN 
1105a32). Aristotle’s principle that the courageous man should act ‘for the sake of the noble’ 
(τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, EN 1115b12-13, 23-24) redirects the order of priority and focuses on the 
intrinsic value of the action rather than on the external rewards that accompany it.21 
 
‘For the sake of the noble’  
Performing an action τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα implies that the agent chooses to act in the way 
he does because he fully appreciates, and is motivated by, the intrinsic beauty or goodness of 
his action.22 The man of citizen courage (in its higher form) and the man of genuine ἀνδρεία 
may indeed prove equally courageous in action. In addition, by displaying courage they act in 
a way that their social milieu, and they themselves, regard as καλόν. The man of genuine 
ἀνδρεία, however, rationally grasps that what renders courageous actions καλόν is their 
intrinsic goodness not the praise or honour that customarily ensues from them. Unlike the 
man of citizen courage who acts with a view to honour, the man of genuine ἀνδρεία is 
motivated by the intrinsic value of his action. What prompts him is the understanding that 
such an action is worth doing in itself, just because it is the kind of action it is, regardless of 
                                                 
21 There is no tension or incompatibility between doing an action ‘for the sake of the noble’ and doing it ‘for its 
own sake’: a courageous action is seen as noble in virtue of its being courageous; see Rogers 1994, 311; 
Richardson Lear 2004, 124-5; Taylor 2006, 86-7. 
22 This is only one of the attributes that Aristotle’s conception of τὸ καλόν entails. I focus on this aspect of τὸ 
καλόν because it is the one most relevant to the distinction that Aristotle draws between ‘citizen courage’ and 
genuine courage. Actions described as καλόν are also rationally chosen, demanding, praiseworthy, fitting or 
appropriate to the circumstances in which they are performed, and (more often than not) other-regarding. 
Actions of genuine ἀνδρεία display, of course, all these characteristics. For Aristotle’s conception of τὸ καλόν, 
see Owens 1981; Broadie 1991, 92-4; Rogers 1993; Nisters 2000, 52-67; Irwin 2010. For a detailed discussion 
of the motivation of Aristotelian ἀνδρεία, see Rogers 1994.    
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any favourable consequences or rewards.23 When the cause justifies the risk, the man of 
genuine courage risks his life in battle even if no honour is to be gained by his action, or even 
if his decision to act courageously is shared by no one but himself. 
Aristotle’s analysis, therefore, shows that πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία, the most typical form of 
Homeric courage, ranks lower than genuine ἀνδρεία. Nonetheless, Aristotle does not 
overlook or underrate the value of the Homeric conception of courage. Aristotle often 
reiterates that becoming truly virtuous, and so acting ‘for the sake of the noble’, is not an easy 
task: few people are endowed with the moral and mental capacities that would enable them to 
achieve this ideal. But the city still needs protection and ordinary men to defend it and risk 
their lives for its sake. Therein lies the value of honour and shame as motivational factors: 
being more applicable to ordinary people than the rational appreciation of τὸ καλόν, the 
desire for honour and a sense of shame in the face of public criticism ensure that the city will 
not be left without protection. As Aristotle observes, while professional soldiers are the first 
to flee, citizen soldiers hold their ground and sacrifice themselves because they prefer death 
to the disgrace of a shameful flight (EN 1116b17-20). ‘Citizen courage’ preserves the city 
even when the citizens are not so philosophically oriented as to fulfil the requirements of τὸ 
καλόν. This pragmatic form of courage, though defective in philosophical terms, is according 
to Aristotle the form that most closely resembles genuine ἀνδρεία.   
 
Conclusion 
Homer occupies a prominent place in the part of Aristotle’s discussion where genuine 
ἀνδρεία is contrasted to five commonly held, but defective, conceptions of courage. Aristotle 
finds that two of these endoxic conceptions, πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία and the courage of θυμός, are 
formulated already in the epics. He therefore appropriates Homer to elucidate and reinforce 
his argument, by citing and alluding to Homeric examples which provide concrete evidence 
of the forms of courage in question. Aristotle singles out these two ‘Homeric’ forms as being 
closer to genuine ἀνδρεία than the rest and explains why they are defective and how they can 
be transformed into genuine ἀνδρεία. Like Homer and Plato, Aristotle sees a connection 
between θυμός and courage, and argues that in order to become true courage the ἀνδρεία of 
θυμός requires deliberation (προαίρεσις) and proper motivation. Courageous actions must be 
the product of rational choice and must be performed with a view to a certain goal. 
                                                 
23 Cf. Cairns 1993, 420, 427n.254; Taylor 2006, 187.  
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Motivation is what distinguishes πολιτική ἀνδρεία from genuine ἀνδρεία as well. ‘Citizen 
courage’ aims at honour, which is a noble thing, but it does not aim at ‘the noble’, τὸ καλόν, 
itself.  
Aristotle’s conception of genuine ἀνδρεία underlines the importance of proper 
motivation for virtuous action and therefore refines, develops, and deepens the Homeric 
representation of courage. Nevertheless, throughout his discussion Aristotle acknowledges 
the validity and value of the Homeric outlook. By ranking the courage of a Hector or a 
Diomedes as second-best next to his conception of genuine ἀνδρεία, Aristotle does justice to 
the authority of the poet and at the same time propounds his own view on what it means to be 
truly courageous by acting ‘for the sake of the noble’.  
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